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Articles and Statements

Impact of the Taliban Reappearance on Afghanistan's Foreign Policy Toward Pakistan

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Abstract

This paper is focused on the impact of the Taliban's reappearance on the foreign policy of Afghanistan towards Pakistan during Hamid Karzai's period. It tries to answer the questions of 'what impactful factors have determined Afghan foreign policy towards Pakistan' and 'how Islamic fundamentalism is used as a soft power instrument of Pakistan foreign policy towards Afghanistan'. In other words, it explores more the political and historical developments in Afghanistan within the designated periods—from 1947 to 2001 and the latter being 2001 to 2014. This paper consists of three main sections. The first section presents historical background of Afghanistan's foreign policy toward Pakistan in consideration with the international developments such as Cold War and 9/11 events with a brief overview of the relations of the two countries. Furthermore in this section it attempts to explain the Durand Line and Pashtonistan problem as the main factors that have influenced the two nation's relations. However, in the following years, while maintaining the real problem, new problems emerged. Such new problems include the Taliban group, India-Afghan relations, Transit problems and Water sharing problem. The second section presents the impact of Taliban reappearance as the most influential factors on Afghanistan's foreign policy on Pakistan in Hamid Karzai's period, especially in explaining the role of Taliban group as soft power instrument of Pakistan's foreign policy toward Afghanistan. Furthermore, it attempts to explain the impact of what is termed as 'Pakistani double game' on the Afghanistan's peace process. It discusses Pakistan since her establishment has exercised political intervention in the Afghanistan internal affairs, as an approach in overcoming the controversial problems between the two nations. In conclusion, analysis on how the post reappearance of the Taliban served to worsen the two neighboring nations' already weak relations are provided. Pakistan's evil foreign policy following the 9/11 September has further fragmented the weak relations with Afghanistan.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Foreign Policy, Fundamentalism, Pakistan, Soft Power, Taliban.

1. Introduction

Studies on Afghanistan and Pakistan have traditionally been centered on controversial Durand line and usage of the "fundamentalism as a "soft power" on "the Pakistan foreign policy tools" toward Afghanistan, which caused domination of conflicts within Afghanistan and

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challenging Afghanistan and Pakistan relations with many political crisis before and during the time of Hamid Karzai presidency.

The content of this article is vital, because it explains a brief historical background of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations since establishment of Pakistan until end of Hamid Karzai presidency and explains the details about the factors which are caused the Taliban reappearance in Afghanistan.

The content features how international diplomacy, regional policy with commonwealth and local realities act as a medium for Pakistan to emerge and dominate selected factors, thus, dominating the whole scene. The stated effective factors are considered as the causal factors for the reappearance of Taliban inside and outside Afghan national boundaries in relation to Pakistan. As such being a case, Afghan-Pakistan relations are thus experiencing unstable diplomacy and lack sustainable peaceful relations in the face of addressing the challenges and threats that are posed by Taliban insurgency and their support from Pakistan.

2. Discussion

1. The Foreign Policy of Afghanistan towards Pakistan

Afghanistan's Foreign Policy Doctrine

Various forms of neutrality have always been considered as Afghanistan's foreign and national security policy. After the First world war and the nation as declaration for independence in 1919, Afghanistan has always advocated neutrality as the nation's official policy statement. Main reason behind the choice is neutrality being taken as an essential for security and balance of power in the region.

Following the invasion of the USSR, the foreign policy has changed to a form that has reflected the continuation of the Soviet foreign policy. In 1990, for the first time the term 'permanent neutrality' had been featured in Afghanistan's constitution (Jahesh 1990: 15-38). This had happened following the Afghanistan's Academy of Science in 1989 study of the feasibility of demilitarized permanent neutrality.

Following the fall of the communist regime in 1991, Mujahedeen accession to power was followed by conflicts within the factions of Mujahideen where by to a large extent this was imposed by the neighboring powers. It was in this period, where foreign policy was isolated from the international community as the Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan.

However the 9/11 incidence turned the tables in that the historical isolation was reverted to multilateral relations with other nations. The relations that Afghanistan has with other nations was highly based on the september 9 and 11 events. This events were the martyrdom of Ahmad Shah Masood on the 9th of September and the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in the US in the September 11, 2001.

Following the fall of the Taliban, the inexperienced and unfocused central government was led to form foreign policies that were in line with the then 'war on terror'. The extensive lack of experience and depth within the government's foreign policies was exhibited by the fluctuations and the lack of formal perspective. In other words there was no strategic policy.

Under President Karzai, the foreign policy of Afghanistan consisted of three rings; the international community, regional countries and Islamic countries (Obaidi, 2015). Consequently, the nation had to exercise pluralistic foreign policy, strengthening of the regional cooperation and consolidating Afghanistan's connection to Islamic civilization as a foreign policy invariant.

A Glance at the Foreign Policy of Afghanistan towards Pakistan

There has been a controversial relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, since the establishment of the Pakistan latter in 1947. The main issues at the controversy are the Durand Line and Pashtunistan (Karaca, 2011: 3). The two nations relations as observed from 1947 to date, have had influence from factors such as the Durand line, Pashtunistan problem, the issue of Taliban, India, Transit way and the waters. However, Taliban is considered as the critical issue between the two nations relations. However, it is necessary to highlight Pakistan's role in the instability within Afghanistan in an aim to have an upperhand as far as the national integrity and security of Pakistan is concerned.

Pakistan having been established in the beginning of Cold war it adopted a foreign policy in harmony with the western bloc. Meanwhile Afghanistan during 1933-1973 under King Mohammad Zahir adopted a neutral policy. With the left and the influence of Mohammed Daoud Khan in 1973,

Afghanistan began to shift towards the Eastern Bloc, so that by the 1979's Soviet occupation it became a full member. Thus, bipolar world order in relation to the foreign policy responses of the two nations had affected the Cold War era development of the two nations.

From her independence in 1947 unto the tenure of the Afghanistan's pro soviet regime in 1978, the Durand Boundary Line and Pashtunistan has constituted the main tension between the two nations. It was in this period where Afghanistan proposed to establish an independent Pashtun state in the northwestern region of 'present day Pakistan'.

1979 and 1989 when considered as the second phase of the relations between the two nations, there was a surge in Afghan left wing regimes relations with Pakistan. The left wing regimes foreign policy towards Pakistan had to do with their interest on Pashtunistan, Durand Line and the Mujahideen.

The third phase is marked with the soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. This was the period from 1989-1996 which played major role in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. It was in this period that Pakistan's influence within the Mujahedeen groups that were in conflict led to Afghanistan's civil war.

The fourth period is marked by the Taliban period. The two nations' relations further changed so that the Durand and Pashtunistan subject became the second topic of the tension. The new issue at the forefront was then the Mujahedeen and the immigrants' problem.

The fifth phase is marked by the regional and international developments in years 2001 to 2014, where the USA carried Operation 'Enduring Freedom' against Taliban. In fact, in this phase Pakistan has been started her dual game playing Afghanistan and International community. Pakistan's political intervention in is the need to reduce India's activity within the Afghanistan. The existence of the rival (India) within Afghanistan is regarded as a potential military threat to Pakistan. For Pakistan, Afghanistan is strategic proxy in the conflict with India.

Impact Factors

A) Durand Line

One of the points halting the efforts to reach the expected stability within Afghanistan is the failure of the International community in addressing the border conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan. On the effective factors that guide the foreign policy of Afghanistan towards Pakistan, it is necessary to begin by visiting the Durand Line issue and show how it poses as a determining factor of the Afghan-Pakistan relations. Most importantly, Durand Line is the boundary established in the Hindu Kush following the Durand Line agreement signed in 1893 between Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and Emir Abdul Rahman. The line was expected to solve the Hindu-Afghan frontier problem for the British influence within the region.

Following the death of Ahmad Shah Durani (founder of Afghanistan), the predecessors failed to maintain the territory so that the modern boundaries became defined by the imperial British and the Tsarist Russia. Furthermore, apart from the boundaries being determined by these external powers, there were efforts made by the Imperial British to institute leaders that would act against Russia.

Following the death of Shah Zaman, there were internal power struggles coupled with that of the Great Britain and the Tsarist Russia over the control of Afghanistan's geographical territory. Russia's expansion from the East reached Afghan borders by 1828. England's expansion towards Afghanistan may be explained by the conquest of India between 1757 and 1857. It was during the British invasion when the Afghanistan people developed animosity towards all forms of western-style reforms. This may be explained by the establishment of the Durand Line in 1893 by the British empire in an aim to further her gain and national interests (Fitzgerald, Gould, 2009: 54).

In the mid-20th century, the area became a subject of the movement of Pashtunistan and independence of the Pashtunistan state. The essence of the problem is based on the question of legitimacy, nature of the agreement (as related to the argument of coercion and periodicity) and its implication on the Pashtun societies located at the belt and as such the question of the Durand Line plays a key role in determining the foreign policies of the two nations towards each other.

Afghanistan has always approached the Durand Line agreement as one that is periodical, so that 100 years are determined to its termination. Thus from 1893 to 1993, however there is no document that can substantiate this claim.

Further talks that had led to negotiating a treaty that ended placing the relations between the two nations on the permanent basis (Fraser, 1953: 198). This treaty was titled, 'Treaty between

Great Britain and Afghanistan establishing Friendly and Commercial Relations', signed on 22 November 1921 in Kabul; may be regarded as a peace agreement aimed at regulating the two nations' relations on the permanent basis (Fraser, 1953: 198). Durand Line was established and recognized on the permanent basis between the Afghanistan and the British India. And this was a means that Afghanistan had used to gain her Independence (Gregorian, 1969: 227-231).

By considering the contents of the treaties that were signed between Afghan government and the British: Durand issue became a critical determinant of the Afghan-Pakistan relations. The rejection of the Durand Line's legitimacy has always been the source of the conflict between the two nations. This is the main reason that the Afghan convoy to the United Nations Assembly of 1947 rejected the independence of Pakistan

Afghan ruler such as Mohammed Daoud Khan and others (including Hamid Karzai) had policies that advocated the illegitimacy of the Durand Line agreement, leading to further escalation of concerns among the two sides of the borders. Furthermore, the results of the referendum of the 1947 whereby the locals of the Durand line chose to stay with Pakistan increased the tension of the matter. From the given explanation, Pakistan has been using Islamic fundamentalism as a soft power in influencing Afghanistan's operation on the matter.

A general consensus within the majority of the international peace stakeholders recognizing Durand Line as legitimate. In addition to the fact that the United States and other countries consider the Durand problem solved with the Pakistan interest, it is apparent that it is impossible to realise the peace and stability goals should the status quo be maintained.

Durand Line is also a part of the proxy war of India against Pakistan. This is through India's recognition of Durand as belonging to Afghanistan as reflected by India's support for the nationalist Pashtun military.

Pakistan considers Pashtun tribes' separatist initiatives within the region as a threat. Should the initiatives be successful three results are paramount; the creation of the separate state of 'Pashtuns', or the acquisition of Pashtun's autonomous status in Pakistan, or the establishment of the great Afghanistan upon the Pashtuns integration unto Afghanistan (Andishmand, 2007: 183).

Afghanistan's 'empowerment' translates to the strengthening of the autonomous demands of the Pashtuns and Balochs populations within the borders of Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan's foreign policy has been unfruitful to the mutual understanding with the neighboring Afghanistan (Ersoy, 2013: 23).

Within internal politics of Afghanistan, there has been a failure among majority of political figures in understanding the political implications of the Durand line. This follows the prevalent rhetorical campaigns of the consolidation of the pashtun societies, hence supporting autonomous Durand Line. Consequently, Pakistan has engaged on long-term interference and the implementation of her patriotic strategy in the Afghan soil. Afghanistan's clarification of the border with Pakistan will determine the end of Pakistan's interference. Historical background of the Durand Line leads to an inevitable conclusion that the nature of the agreement and the presence of the tribal societies and the geography and the influence of the colonial powers have led the Durand Line to be an effective factor influencing the Afghanistan and Pakistan relations.

B) Taliban (Appearance and Fall)

Taliban as an effective factor; the roots of Taliban are well observed from the days of the soviet collapse. The collapse of the Soviets was followed by the subsequent shift of focus of the West away from Afghanistan. This had profound impact on the state building phase of Afghanistan and hence civil war and emergence of the Taliban as a social movement to address the power vacuum.

Since the appearance of the Taliban in the 1996, unto the regime's fall, to Hamid Karzai's tenure as a president, unto the present day Afghanistan has Taliban as the immediate and central threat associated with all other factors affecting the peace and stability of Afghanistan.

A summary of Taliban, may also be explained as a network of Afghans and Pakistanis on the border. It was at the border region where a significant number of the Afghan immigrants in the camps received military training by Pakistan military and other Islamic fundamentalist groups. This was aided by the financial support of America and Saudi Arabia (Rubin, 2006).

The aim had been for Pakistan to establish a government in Afghanistan that would be close to Pakistan. This was done by supporting the Islamic Afghan groups and parties such as that of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and later unto Taliban. This was also done with the aim of solving the border problem and to reach the Central Asian energy and economic resources.

The prominence of Taliban as a social movement that garnered the support of the Afghan people can be explained by the then existed political and social chaos that was left behind following the the Soviet Army's withdrawal. There had been fights among the Islamic party commanders headed by Hekmatyar and supported by the ISI. Also the increased problem of smuggling of drugs and weapons, torturing merchants among other social evils, made Taliban to come out with a positive outlook.

The beginning of the legacy of Taliban began when the international community was brought into direct confrontation with Taliban following the presence of Osama bin Laden (Al-Qaeda) in Afghanistan. This was due to his allegiance to holding responsibility for both 1998 US attacks in Africa and the plane attacks in New York on 11th September 2001. Taliban support of Osama Bin Laden led the US to attack Afghanistan. The attack by US against Taliban and Al-Qaeda led to the fall of Taliban regime and the subsequent flee of both Al-Qaeda and Taliban to Pakistan.

C) India

India as an effective factor; India has a long history of cultural and political connection with Afghanistan. Both India and Pakistan have played a role in shaping the political and social developments within Afghanistan in the aim of furthering their interests in the grounds of economic interests, defense and in ensuring that none of the two rivals gains advantage over the other. India recognizes the social and economic development in Afghanistan as a vital path towards the regional security and stability.

Implications of the Indian-Afghan relations and the efforts of ensuring the stability of the region, implications has always been an effective factor on Afghan-Pakistan relations. Pakistan in return has worked to discourage the ties between Afghanistan and India, as it is perceived as a threat towards Pakistan's national integrity.

India's strategies towards Afghanistan are aimed at establishing a strong influence within the political arena of Afghanistan. Provision of development aid has also been a strategy of seeking economic influence within Afghanistan. India has also regionalized the means to solution as related to Afghan security and stability problems. The military assistance to Afghanistan have also aimed at strengthening the nation's defense and security system so as to curb Taliban and Pakistan's threat. All these strategies are meant to allow projection of power by India within the region.

Price (2013) argued, it was India that expressed the allegation of Taliban having links with ISI long before this became substantial within the major authorities in the West. India has been concerned with the link between Taliban and Pakistan, infact India does consider Taliban as a moderate group watsover.

With such an influence, Pakistan has also played a dialectic role of against India's influence in Afghanistan. This is due to Pakistan's search for a projection of political and economical power among the region in general. And thus the strategies employed by Pakistan include those of training Taliban and other fundamentalist groups to counter India's influence in Afghanistan. This as a result has led Afghanistan's foreign policy to be shaped against Pakistan's influences and actions.

D) Transit Way

Transit Way as an effective factor; Afghanistan has historically been known as a regional junction in spite of being a landlocked country. Afghanistan is located on the historic track of the Silk Road that served as the junction between the central Asia and south Asia. The economic benefit of such a geographical location cannot be taken advantage due to the prevalent wars within Afghanistan leading to the destruction of the major infrastructures. Furthermore, lack of technical capacity and skilled staff for maintenance of the roads have worsen the situation within the transportation system.

Afghanistan reaches the boundary waters through Pakistan and Iran. There have been great challenges on Afghanistan's maritime transport arising from her neighbors especially Pakistan. With the existing political tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan since Pakistan's establishment as a nation. Pakistan has always taken advantage of Afghanistan (economically and politically) in allowing her to access the free waters.

The Pakistan has Afghanistan as the second-largest trading partner, while Afghanistan has Pakistan as the largest trading partner. Regardless of such a significant trade partnership evidenced by the trade volume, there are difficult transit requirements posed by Pakistan towards

Afghanistan in the areas such as insurance mechanisms, streamlined payments settlement, the use of bonded carriers, visa issuance, trade financing, tax collection and documentation.

In an aim to consolidate the trade partnership the two nations signed Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) in 2011 for solving the transit and trade problems, replacing the Afghan-Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA), that was signed in 1965 ([Ministry of Commerce and Industries, 2011](#)).

The resigning of the APTTA does not however guarantee that Pakistan will be bound to observe the elements within the agreement. This follows the customary use of transit issues as a strategy of furthering economic and political goals.

E) Water

Water as an effective factor; Afghanistan is landlocked and mountainous country, bordered by six countries which Afghanistan share water with five of them. For example, Helmand River's waters are shared with Iran, and for Kabul River's waters are shared with Pakistan.

As a result water diplomacy has become an essential topic in order to regulate and ensure that water sharing leads to positive diplomacy between the neighboring countries, hence fulfilling the nation's economic and political objectives. Majority of the wars that will be engaged in the 21st century will be over the "water".

In the case of Afghanistan and Pakistan, there are many rivers that emerge from Afghanistan thus providing a leverage point for Afghanistan in her diplomatic dealings with Pakistan. Among the rivers that originate from Afghanistan include; Amu, Morghab, Harirud, Helmand and Kabul. These rivers have played as a potential leverage points of Afghanistan's influence on neighboring nations due to the fact that most of the waters that originates from Afghan soil form a very important basis of the neighboring countries water consumption.

A number of projects established in Afghanistan results to concern and hence interventionism by Pakistan. Naghlu, Mah-i-par, Sorobi and Darunta projects which were built over Kabul's River, however the exploitation of such projects have resulted to tension between the two nations.

According to the United Nations Water Program, Pakistan is already ranked as the seventh on the list of countries that are facing severe water insufficiency. Apart from the environmental the fast growing population, any more factors to worsen the situation has to be met with serious contingency plans and strategies by Pakistan. Kabul River covers almost 20 % of annual water demand within Pakistan. Between the years 2009 and 2016, there was a decrease in the water per capita from 1500 to 1017 cubic meters. This led to the classification of Pakistan as one among the countries with severe water scarcity from the former watertight country ([Faheem, 2016: 28](#)). According to IMF, Pakistan is the third largest country facing severe water shortage. This places the question of water scarcity as one of the major concerns of Pakistan in relation to her security threat. It is expected that the question of the need for agreements on the waters between the two nations will increase. Afghanistan is expected to have an advantage on the issue of Durand Line and the threat of terrorism and Taliban against Pakistan as she will be using the water diplomacy as a political tool throughout the negotiations. Thus, the water issue has to be considered with all details so that to have a good understanding of the conclusion that will be drawn in all the forthcoming agreements.

The implications of Pakistan's objective of control and determination of Afghanistan's water resource and Afghanistan water diplomacy against Pakistan became an effective factor on both countries relation. In fact, Durand line is a political and technical obstacle in signing a comprehensive water contract between the two nations. Thus, solving the Durand Line issue or technically diversion of water between two countries and having a strategic plan that will guide and moderate both sides' use of the common waters for the benefit of the people within the region and furthering social welfare, peace and stability within the region is the only solution. Furthermore, there is a necessity of signing agreements that are well informed with the current international laws. These agreements should also reflect comprehensible and proved reconciliation models. In so doing the region will avoid making water issues in relation to political aspects as a source of serious conflicts within the region.

2. Impact of the Taliban Reappearance in Afghanistan Foreign Policy on Pakistan In Hamid Karzai Period

For the past 14 years, the reappearance of Taliban may be attributed to the mixture of both Pakistan's dual role-playing and the western's mistakes in addressing fundamentalism in Afghanistan. The reappearance has led to subsequent instability and has weakened the government's potential to exercise its authority effectively.

Prior to the war on Afghanistan, President Bush demanded only that Taliban oust its leader and cut its ties to Al-Qaeda. This position was also supported by Pakistan's President Musharraf was in favor of and hence supported (Kinzer, 2007: 276). The refusal of Taliban to cut ties with Al-Qaeda on the 7th of October, led to the onset of the US operation in Afghanistan. This was apparent as the CIA and Special Activities Division entered Afghanistan. The US also provided the air support to the Northern Alliance forces leading to the defeat against the Taliban. The defeat of Taliban was witnessed by the subsequent flee of the group to Pakistan (Riedel, 2011: 161).

Following the Operation Endure Freedom, Taliban being uprooted they secured safe haven among tribal protectors living between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The intermission was followed with the apparent terrorist attacks that after extending towards the US convoy and Afghan military personnel, they effectively garnered the attention of the West.

Two factors (internal and external) have resulted to the reappearance of Taliban, these are presence of Pakistan's use of Islamic fundamentalism as a soft power instrument of its foreign policy towards Afghanistan. Secondly, Iraqi war and the subsequent shift of attention of the US and NATO from Afghanistan national building phase. With the continuing ineffectiveness of the Afghan government, Taliban reappearance was paramount.

Impact of Pakistani double game on Afghanistan Peace Process

Following the 9/11 September, Pakistan has played dual roles in the campaigns against the terrorist activities-as a member of the global coalitions against terrorism led by the US and as a clandestine support for fundamentalist armed groups such as Taliban and Haqqani network.

Many authorities on the matter, have pointed at Pakistan's support for Taliban for more than a decade, through ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) supporting the Taliban group who are in war with the central government of Afghanistan. Pakistan's support for Taliban has served to worsen the political situation in relation to Afghanistan. As a result of Pakistan's dual playing game, Karzai's foreign policy towards Pakistan was highly unstable and unbalanced.

US government policy of maintaining ties with Pakistan has effectively halted down the efforts of the Afghan government in fighting against the Taliban. Pakistan's use of militant fundamentalist can only be met with direct confrontation with the Western powers. The support of fundamentalist by Pakistan has a leverage over NATO forces in the region, Pakistan values this strategic asset.

Pakistan's apparent framework of identifying the Taliban as the 'good and bad' has had profound effects on all the policies that were meant to curb the fundamentalist group. For Pakistan 'Bad Taliban' has reflected the Taliban groups that have been associated with terrorism acts within Pakistan. The 'Good Taliban' are those that have fought against Afghan government.

Afghan officials are concerned with the increasing ties between Pakistan's religious schools and Afghan Taliban. This follows Pakistan's over 30,000 fundamentalist religious schools officially active promoting fundamentalism in the region in partnership with the local government (Atlaspress, 2016) Allegation that have been directed towards Pakistan as related to the support of the Taliban have always been received by a somewhat acceptance of the contacts but not controlling influence on the militant group (Azami, 2016).

Pakistan's security service has been known to provide to Taliban insurgents fighting against the NATO forces in Afghanistan. This has to a high extent created tension between the US and Pakistan as a number of middle ranking Taliban commanders have revealed the existing support from Pakistani government agencies. These Taliban commanders revealed these significant insights in the interviews that were conducted by BBC Two documentary series, "Secret Pakistan" (Croft, 2011).

The United States Congressional Research Service (CRS) report summarizes that many analysts believe that Pakistan's intelligence services know the whereabouts of ... Afghan Taliban leadership elements and likely even maintain active contacts with them at some level as part of a

hedge strategy in the region. Some reports indicate that elements of Pakistan's major intelligence agency and military forces aid the Taliban (Kronstadt, 2009: 12).

Pakistan's fundamental strategy in dealing with the regional affair seems to have remained the same since 1970 (Riedel, 2008: 40). According to Steve Coll (2010), Pakistan's national interests in Afghanistan as seen from the briefing to the US explicitly reports 'one overriding concern: India.' Indeed, in February 2010, the US Director of National Intelligence confirmed that 'Islamabad's conviction that militant groups are an important part of its strategic arsenal to counter India's military and economic advantages' (Blair, 2010).

According to the report by London School of Economics, the relationship between ISI and Taliban is broader than what had been thought before among the stakeholders of the international community. The author of the report (who is the Harvard Analyst, Matt Waldman) further points to the seriousness of the problem as to the extent that there are undeniable evidences that prove the connections as opposed to mere deductions. Matt Waldman explains further that the extent of support of ISI to Taliban groups is too extensive that it is an official policy of the agency. The support is both operational and strategic (BBC, 2010a). In 2010 Mr. Waldman spoke with nine local Taliban commanders in Afghanistan. Most of the commanders claimed to have contacts with ISI agents who have occasionally attended the Quetta Shura, which is the group's top leadership council (Taliban top leader council).

There are some findings depicting the fact that the Taliban leaders are not independent players. This follows the fact that Taliban's Pakistani patrons, the army and the ISI have always controlled the very lives of the Taliban team in Doha. Amrullah Saleh, former head of Afghan Intelligence points at the frequent flights of the Taliban members from Doha and Karachi in meeting their supervisors or their families (Riedel, 2013).

However, following the death of Mullah Omar in April 2013, there comes a questionable future of Taliban, its leadership, and thus, the fate of the ongoing peace talks in Afghanistan. Upon considering the question of Afghanistan's reconciliation prospects with Taliban (in relation to Omar's death) it is reasonable to consider the interview of Amrullah Saleh with Kumar (2015). In the interview Amrullah states explicitly his disdain over the Pakistan-led peace talks. He also points out that the plausible way would be to establish a round table for peace talks that are Afghanistan-led and Afghanistan-owned. In his view Pakistan does not have a record for being a peace broker in the region, instead Pakistan proactive in conflicts and war within the region.

Evidences show Pakistan manipulating the relations with Afghanistan by creating the impression that Kabul is arranging the negotiations with the Taliban. The motif behind can be explained as a need for Pakistan to create a positive image to both the International community and Afghanistan. This follows after the allegations that have run for decades of Pakistan's role as war broker in Afghanistan.

It was in expectation of Hamid Karzai that following the 9/11th of September events, Pakistan would significant supporter in the fight against terror in the region particularly the one arising from the fundamentalist armed groups. Although Pakistan did not meet Hamid Karzai's expectations, there were still efforts that were made by Kabul in all the 14 years of Karzai's administration to draw Pakistan unto cooperating in the peace process. All these efforts were however met by the unwillingness of the ISI to curb or interrupt Taliban maneuvers. Several times, Karzai expressed the futility that would come as a result of Pakistan's positive role in the peace and stability of the region.

The disinterest in Afghanistan's peace and stability that has been expressed by Pakistan in form of her support has only served to worsen the countries' diplomatic ties. As a result the discord of the two countries approaches in dealing with Taliban has led Taliban not to take serious the talks thus furthering further decay in peace and stability.

Indeed, careful observation of Afghanistan would depict a clear picture that there had not been any head or government that made the strides in trying to establish positive ties with Pakistan as it was done by President Karzai. President Karzai made 21 trips to Pakistan as one of his efforts in getting closer so as to establish mutual beneficial foreign policies between the two neighbors that would further the defeat of fundamentalist threats within the region. It may well be said that, when it comes to the Afghanistan's peace prospects it is US that has always come first then followed by Pakistan (Neda, 2014).

This consequently, led to hindering of the peace building process in Afghanistan. For an effective strategy towards the peace process, four parts are of paramount importance; Afghan central government, Taliban, Pakistan and the US. But of all these four groups it is Pakistan that can coordinate the whole process unto the desired results. Lack of a unified policy and approach resulting to Pakistan's unwillingness to allow peace building process to thrive in Afghanistan has made the goal impossible.

On base of above statements it is clear that Pakistan is the essential obstacle on Afghanistan peace process. Usage of the Taliban as political pressure instrument by Pakistan is preventing economic growth and caused continuation of conflict and chaos in Afghanistan. Permanent peace in Afghanistan can be established under the following conditions; establishing a national consensus in Afghanistan to ensure permanent peace, strengthen the central government and institutionalization. Furthermore, America, NATO, United Nations and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation should bring high political and economic pressures on Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban and allowing them to set for negotiations and compromise with the Afghan government.

As a conclusion, Pakistan's efforts that have been apparent within the journey of Afghanistan and Taliban peace talks can be understood as somewhat of calculated and strategic nature. This involves a means by which Pakistan will be able to solicit Afghanistan's help (intelligence information) in combating Pakistan Taliban (TPP). It is worth of note, that in view of the apparent contradiction was witnessed in the actions and statements of Taliban, Karzai's administration suspended the negotiations to a higher extent. Afghanistan government has however an obligation to form and focus on an Afghan-led negotiations with the Taliban. Thus, it is such a framework that will form a stable lasting political solution. Thus, under the framework of an Afghan-led talks and peace process, there seems to be a less likelihood that Pakistan shall reinforce the cause of Afghanistan.

When one considers the role interplayed by the external power's interests and the prevalent weakness and the inefficiency of the Afghan government; it thus suffices to reason for the difficulty that Afghanistan has had towards national and peace building. Fundamentalist groups (such as Taliban group) in collusion with immediate neighbors such as Pakistan and Iran have used the inefficiency within the central government of Afghanistan to create an environment of chaos. Even worse is the fact that most terrorist and other non-state actors have acquired an ability to cross borders, acquiring necessary facilities to further their ends through the use of the very powers that are considered the part of the international community. In other words, the fundamentalist groups have often been appearing as agents of regional or global powers in shaping their foreign policy.

3. Conclusion

Pakistan has played the most important role and at the same time is the most influential state in the last half century developments of Afghanistan. Because of the border dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Pakistan has consistently been involved in Afghanistan's internal affairs, unfortunately the manner with which Pakistan has involved herself with Afghanistan has been that of supporting the insurgent groups fighting against the central government of Afghanistan. Pakistan has thus been in a constant and strategic struggle as an attempt to mobilize the political affairs of Afghanistan.

As Pakistan was in the verge of being established in 1947, it was faced by opposition from nationalistic thoughts among Afghan executives who wanted to secure the Pashtun demography beyond the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan-to be. With India as an ally of Afghanistan Pakistan perceives a military threat to her national integrity and security within its borders.

Since its birth, the state of Pakistan has used fundamentalism as an element of military-political mobilizations in Afghanistan. Pakistani army and intelligence has used Islamic fundamentalism as the security and strategic depth with in protecting the territorial integrity of the country. For the next several years, in both India and Afghanistan, the warrior continued this role by supporting fundamentalist groups. Likewise, the Pakistani army has supported the political Islamist parties for their political purposes and used them for the national interest of Pakistan.

Following the Cold War, when the Pakistani army became close to fundamentalist groups and began to use fundamentalism as an outward-looking foreign policy instrument. At such a point Pakistani army emphasized ideological values that had a basis on elements of Islamic fundamentalism, to the then plausible audience (Mujahedeen). Practical steps to radicalize the

society were also employed by Pakistan as the West was also backing the Afghan Mujahedeen to fight against USSR. In 2001, Pakistan had then established good relations with most fundamentalist groups such as Taliban. This gave Pakistan a vantage point to use the fundamentalist groups as soft power instrument of her foreign policy towards Afghanistan.

Afghanistan's stability has always been perceived by Pakistan as threatening particularly on the central government's stern attitude towards Pakistan on matters regarding the Durand Line and Pashtunistan problems. In this context, Pakistan has consistently endeavored to weaken Afghanistan's central governments. Pakistan has built its basic strategy for "Afghanistan" to support groups fighting against the central government of Kabul. After 2001, it seemed that Pakistan tried to weaken the central government in Afghanistan by cooperating with Taliban terrorist group against Karzai administration with a different approach.

Following the September 11 incidents, the Taliban regime was overtaken by the US and Coalition forces. For the first time, the United States and Western states resolved the Bonn conference in Afghanistan and decided on the future of Afghanistan without Pakistan's influence. Pakistan, unhappy with these developments, helped the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and the Taliban against the Karzai new government. In this period, the relations between the two countries did not improve despite the mutual visits. Pakistan embarked on her policy of hosting and supporting Taliban and other terror groups in Afghanistan, where suicide attacks and bombardment attacks took place, and the insurgency against the Kabul government increased. With such a policy, Pakistan was serving the destabilization of Karzai's government, and thus, aiming to make the international community fail in Afghanistan.

For Pakistan, a strong Afghanistan threatens the territorial integrity of Pakistan. This comes at the time when India poses a military threat to Pakistan. Afghanistan's situation plays a significant role in Pakistan's national security and integrity. Pakistan standing with nuclear arms has thus sought to maintain her national security and integrity at the destruction of Afghanistan.

Pakistan's double standards in struggle against fundamentalism and terrorism in the region played a major role in the Taliban's reappearance. Therefore, the main factors that influenced the foreign policy (during Hamid Karzai's tenure) toward Pakistan was that of resurgence of Taliban. Thus, the Afghanistan's foreign policy toward Pakistan during the Hamid Karzai period was unstable and destabilized.

Taliban has become the greatest threat to both Afghanistan and Pakistan's stability. Historical experience reveals that the two countries are sharing a common destiny for the future. Therefore, the relations of the two countries are of great importance for the security and stability of region. Although the relations between the two countries are the stage for tensions, dialogue gates have been kept open. The two sides sharing the same culture and common values, even though they agreed to form and develop good neighborly and friendly relations, but both sides were brought face to face with the continuous intervention of external forces. The only way to improve cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan is based on the consideration by both states on the benefits of normalization and stability in the two nation's relations.

Furthermore, positive relations as depicted by the positive foreign policies of the two nations towards each other will lead towards economic progress and development within the region. This can however happen if Pakistan will forsake her 'double game' in her dealings with Afghanistan.

Mutual initiatives have to be made for Pakistan to close down the madrassa and militant training camps. Afghan authority has to get the support of Pakistan in apprehending the Taliban commanders who have used Pakistan as the safe haven so as justice may take its course. This will lead to an atmosphere of mutual trust hence effective foreign policies to foster stability and peace within the region.

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